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ABSTRACT
Output variation type Cournot duopoly game is studied in the
framework of differential game theory. Necessary conditions for a
general case are developed in their typical coupled form and the
difference between an open- loop control (supply adjustment) and a closed-
loop control is pointed out. Linear dynamic market demand function and
quadratic cost functions case is then studied in detail and analytic
expressions for the optimal Cournot controls are obtained in terms of the
solution of (1) a set of differential equations for a finite horizon case
(t€[0,T)) and (2) a set of algebraic equations for an infinite horizon
case (t€[0,«)). A numerical example is solved for both optimal Cournot
open-loop and closed-loop controls ar. their respective equilibria. The
equilibrium solutions are then compared with the collusive duopolist
(optimal control) equilibrium solution.
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DYNAMIC DUOPOLY GAME
:
DIFFERENTIAL GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
M. Simaan and T. Takayama*
Introduction
Static and comparative static formulations of the duopoly game
following the line of Coumot (189?) and Stackelberg (1934) flourished in
the 1950' s after the path-breaking work of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior . Zero-sum or non-zero-sum,
two (or n) person games, cooperative or non-cooperative games, etc. are
well documented (see Shubik (1959) for instance). Methodologically, the
static and traditional duopoly theory seems to have failed to actively
interact with game theoretic approaches (see Osborne (1971)).
It may be worthwhile to point out that logical developments of
the traditional duopoly game in its comparative static sense (see Cyert
and DeGroot (1973a) and Friedman (1968) for instance) take advantage of
a type of sequential decision~tnaking procedures in reaching some reasonable
solutions, and have taken a step toward dyaamizatibn of the traditional
theory. However, they seem to have failed to completely dynamize their
models. An interesting venture by Simon, Puig and Aschoff (1973) of
M. Simaan is Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of
Electrical Engineering and the Coordinated Science Laboratory, and T. Takayama
is Professor of Economics, both at the University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign.

2constructing and simulating a dynamic duopoly model led them to a dynamic
programming model of the Bellman type and ended with a very negative note
that essentially negates all hopes for analytic attempts to answer duopoly
questions posed initially by Cournot. We are of the opinion that this
negative conclusion is premature and dynamic Cournot duopoly theory is
about to emerge as a natural extension of these previous works.
The authors are not aware of the existence of a genuinely dynamic
duopoly game model (see Cyert and DeGroot (1973b) , and for a "Market
Intensity" and two person zero-sum game theoretic approach see Clemhout et al.
(1971)}, This may be partly due to the fact that any non-cooperative dynamic
duopoly game does not seem to fit into the framework of ordinary dynamic
optimisation models such as optimal control models (see Ho (1970) and
Intriiiigator (1971)), Thus, this dynamic duopoly problem has to be
approached from a different angle, a new angle to be taken up in this paper.
In the first section of this paper, we briefly review static
Cournot. duopoly games as a lead to the following development of our
dynamic duopoly game. In Section 2 we formulate the traditional duopoly
game as a typical non~2ero sum, non-cooperative differential game problem.
Then we formally define two typically supply adjustment decision rules:
(i) open-loop control rule, and (ii) closed-loop control rule.
In Section 3 we derive the necessary conditions for the supply
adjustment control paths to be optimal for both firms and rules the firms
an omploy, and discuss their general properties in terms of marginal costs
and marginal revenue, etc.

Linear market demand function and quadratic total cost functions
case is then analyzed In detail in Section 4, and a solution procedure is
developed to generate the optimal open-loop and closed-loop controls for
both finite and infinite, time horizon problems.
In Section 5, an infinite horizon numerical example is solved
and the optimal control paths for the closed-loop and open-loop adjustment
rules are obtained, and the differences between these two adjustment rules
are pointed oat.
In Section 6, collusive duopolistic case* in which both firms
act as collusive duopolists, is handled as a typical problem in optimal
control theory. The same numerical example treated in Section 5 is then
solved for the collusive solution and the three numerical solutions are
tabulated for comparison and further investigation.
In the last section, we conclude this paper by pointing out
some possible directions of future developments in this interesting area.
1^ Static Cournot Duopoly Game
The traditional duopoly game problem can be cast in the following
constrained profit maximization framework.
Let 1 => 1,2 stand for firms 1 and 2, x, for the output produced
and placed in the market by the ith firm, and x for the total marketed quantity,
which satisfies the following identify:
(1.1) * X - X. + x„.
.1 /.

It is assumed that the total marketed quantity x and the market
price are to satisfy the following well behaved continuous and differentiable
(in R,) functional relationship:
(1.2) p - h(x).
Total cost functions for both firms are known to each firm as
%* (x .r ) » i -1>2. Each firm is then assumed to maximize its profit
(1.3) n
t
- p. Xi -g j (xi )
~ x
±
h(x) - gi (xi ), i
- 1,2.
The Cournot equilibrium point (x*,x£) is defined by the following
pair of inequalities
(1.4) )
[n
2
(x*,xj) >n2 (x*,x2 ),
and, if typical concavity and differentiability conditions for tt^ and tt
with respect: to x_ and x« respectively are satisfied, it can be obtained by
solving the following simultaneous equations:
5rr drr
(1.5) r~ « and ~— = 0.
OX- ox
?
Tlie Stackelberg equilibrium point and other equilibrium points
such as the Pa re to or von Neumann equilibrium point can be readily
definable (see Osborne (1971)). However, for the purpose of the present
paper the definition above is sufficient, and no further investigation will
be carried to other equilibrium concepts at this stage.

2. Dynamic Duopoly Game—Definitions and Formulations
As is customary in most dynamic models, our dynamic
duopoly game depends heavily on the system dynamics that works in the market,
In this paper, we assume that the market follows the following dynamics:
(2.1) -dip- H P< c > * *(P<t),x(t))
for t€[0,T)
which states in essence that the rate of change of the market price of the
(single) commodity at time t is determined by the present price level,
p(t), and the total supply of the commodity by the duopo lists,
(2.2) x'(t) £ KAt) + x.(t)
1 A.
where x-(t) and x~(t) are 'outputs or supply quantities by firms 1 and 2
at time fc, respectively.
The dynamic demand function (or price adjustment function, the
closest terminology we can find in static stability argument of a general
equilibrium (see Nikaido (1970))), (2.1), may be justified on the following
ground. Consider the situation where f(p(t),x(t)) can be written as
(2.3) f(p(t),x(t)) - G(h(x(t)) -p(t))
where G(u) is a monotone increasing function of the argument and satisfies
the following conditions (see Samuelson (1947)):
(2.4) G(0) - and -j^- > for Vu€R.

This G function can be considered as the speed of the adjustment function.
If, at a certain time t. €[G,T), h(x(t.)) -p(t-) f for some reason such
I " I i
as the market price during its adjustment process was not high (low) enough
^
resulting in a smaller (larger) supply quantity appearing in the market (see
A(B) in Figure 1) than the market actually desired at that price level, then
the market price moves in the direction stipulated by (2.1) or (2.3) that is,
p(t) > for A and p(t) < for B. If \<ie assume that the supply per period
remains the same for a while after t.. , then the price p(t) will move upward
(A) (downward (B)) thereafter, along the vertical axis until it reaches
A'(B') at time. t„ > t. where h(x(t.)) - p(t.) = holds. The rationale
i. I Li.
above is a genuinely dynamic price adjustment mechanism, and is considered
to be a natural extension of the static price response function (see
Nikaido (1970)).
In this paper we also assume that
(2.5)
~- < and ---- < for i * 1,2,
op — ox -
for all x(t)
which seem rather acceptable (see Section 5). Condition (2.5 ii) is to
insure that the price will never cross the quantity axis to the negative
price region.
In the above price adjustment process (or system dynamics) the
supply quantity x(t) Is treated as an exogenous variable, thus arbitrarily
given. However, as is clear from the content of x(t), once the market

price is known, the supply quantity is the sum of the optimum outputs
of both firms , x.. (t) and x (t), and each optimum supply quantity x„ (t),
i ~ 1,2 is assumed to be the profit maximizing output (trajectory) over
time of each firm.
The total profit for the ith firm over the time horizon [0,T) is defined as
T
-r. t 1/
(2.6) TT
i
(x
1
(t),x
2
(t)) -
J
e
L [p(t)x
i
(t> -g
i
(t,x.(t))jdt
'
o
for i = 1,2
where
(2.7) TC, s gi (t,xi (t)) for i
- 1,2
is the total cost function of the ith firm and r.. is an appropriate
discount rate for the ith firm. Thus the optimum supply quantities
x. (t) , 1 * 1,2 over t6[0,T) can be obtained as the solution of the
following dynamic optimization problems
(i) Find x (t) that maxirni (ii) Find x->(t) that maximizes
1
j
i.
(2.8) TT
1
(x
1
(t),x
2
(t)) subject to
j
TTt> (x.,(t) ,x2
(t)) subject to
(2.1) for t 6 [0 (2.1) for t €[0,T).
1/
— In this profit function, the revenues at t, p(t) x. (t) for
i * 1,2 are assumed to be received at the ongoing (disequilibrium) price
if the initial price p was in disequilibrium. This might be considered
as a loss (gain) in the -sales department as a result of accumulation
(decumulation) of inventory during the adjustment process when the initial
price p was higher (lower) than the equilibrium price for some reason.
Introduction of inventory into the system dynamics as another component
will be handled in a forthcoming paper.

8It is clear from the structure of the twin (more appropriately
"coupled") maximization problems above that, it is impossible to solve
them separately. This suggests that our problem of solving this dynamic
dupoloy game is best formulated and studied within the framework of
differential game theory (see Kuhn and Szego (1971), Starr and Ho (1969a),
(1969b) and Simaan and Cruz (1973a), (1973b)),
Roughly speaking, a differential game is a system whose states
are described by a set of differential equations and where there are
more than one decision-maker in the game each trying to optimize a different
objective function. In our case, the state of the system is the price
p(t)» the control variables are the supply quantities x. (t) and x
?
(t),
and the objective functions are the profit functions tt and tt in (2.6).
In this paper we confine our dynamic duopoly model to a homo-
geneous product and single dynamic market demand function case following
the tradition of C is, other models dealing with slightly
differentiated product fall outside of the scope of this paper.
It is important at this stage, to point out one of the most
interesting features of this dynamic duopoly game. The dynamic time paths
of the control variables (supply quantities) x-(t) and x /) (t) can be
constructed in two quite different manners. The first is an open-loop
control form that completely ignores the information from the state, p(t)
,
and moves along the prescribed path set at the beginning stage of the
game (thus depending on the initial price p(0) and time t only). We write
this open-loop path as (x (t), x„ (t)).— ' The second is a closed-loop
—
' Strictly speaking these should be written as (x, (t,p(0)),
x2o^ t > p ( ^)» but: ior simplicity and since p(0) is a known constant we will write
them as (x., (t),x (t)).
^ lo v 2o v

form that takes time path of the state p(t) as additional information
(feedback) and adjusts its course as p(t) and t change. The closed-
loop control path is written as (x, (t ,p(t)) ,x„ (t,p(t))). Thus the
Cournot behavior of the two firms is defined by the following conditions
(t) ,**<£)) > IT (x <t),x* <t))
,y q*. t.0 l 10 ^o
for the open- loop path and by
^
1
(K*
c
(t,p(t)),X2
c
(t,p(t))) > TT
1
(x
lc
(t > p(t)),x*
c
(t,p(t)))
TT
2
(x*
c
(t,p(t)),X*
c
(t, P(t))) > TT2 (x*c (t, P(t)),X2c (t > p(t)))
for the closed-loop path- Due to the similarity between (2. 9} and (2.10),
we call the dynamic equilibrium paths (2.9) and (2.10) as open-loop
dynamic Cournot path and closed-loop dynamic Cournot path respectively.
Thus the total open-loop market Cournot supply quantity at time t is
(2.11) x*(t) - x*
o
(t) +x*Q (t)
and its intersection with the dynamic demand curve p(t) = f(p(t),x (t))
will then yield the optimal open-loop market price p*(t). Similarly the
total closed-loop market Cournot supply quantity at time t is
(2.12) x*(t >P (t>) - x*
c
(t )P (t)) + x*
c
(t,p(t))
and its intersection with the dynamic demand curve p(t) = f(p(t),x (t,p(t)))
will yield the optimal closed-loop market price p*(t)
.
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As will be shown later, and demonstrated by a numerical example,
these two different dynamic Cournot paths actually generate two quite
different supply responses and their welfare consequences may be argued
to be substantially different.
3. Necessary Condit ions for Optima lity of
Dynamic Cournot Paths
In developing necessary conditions for our optimal dynamic
Cournot paths, we apply the Pontryagin Maximum Principle (see Pontryagin
et al. (1962))
A. Closed -Looa Controls
Due to the intrinsic virtue of utilizing market price as
additional information in guiding its adjustment of the firms' outputs,
we develop the conditions for the closed-loop Cournot paths, x*(t,p(t)),
1C
i 1,2 , first.
Eased on the definition of the closed-loop dynamic Cournot
paths (2.10) we form the Hamiltonian for the ith firm as follows:
(3-1) H, - p(t)x
i
(t,p(t)) -g
l
(t,x
l
(t.,p(t))) + X
i
(t)f(p(t),x
1
(t,p(t))
+ x
2
(t,p(t)))
,
for i - 1,2.
Now the necessary conditions (see Arrow (1968)) for the maximizations of
(2.11) can be derived as:

11
C3.2W
Firm 1
r .
(i)<
p(t) - f(p(t),x
1
(t
>
p(t))+x
2
(t,p(t)))
, p(0) = p
£
X
l(
t) - rX
l(
t)
-x^t.pCt)) .X
l(
t)(M + JjL
^)
ox.
\ <T) =
Firm 2
]
2/
(ii)<
p(t) - f(p(t),x
1
(t,p(t))+x
2
(t,p(t)))
, p(0) - pQ
3x
"1
ag,
P<t)~^ + X 2 ( t)^0
^
X
2
(T) « 1/
Here we assume that r -- r,
;
= r for simplicity and that g. , for i = 1,2
and f are such that the Hamiltonians H, and h\ are strictly concave in x.
1 z 1
and x.? respectively, so that maximization of H.. by x. is achieved by
setting -—* = for i ~ 1,2,
ox.
X
Now we face a difficult problem of solving the two point boundary
problem consisting of a system of partial differential equations (3,2)
3/
—
' If for a finite horizon problem the profit functions (2.6)
were to include a terminal profi; 'p(T)) accounting for the salvage
value of ith firm at the end of the operating period T, then the boundary
oF
1
(p(T))
condition on X. in (3.2) should be changed to X. (T) =
x i op(D
but for the sake of similicity, this term is neglected in this paper
,
i - 1,2,
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for which in general an analytic solution is extremely difficult to
obtain. However in the following two sections, we introduce a linear
dynamic- demand function and quadratic cost functions and show how to
solve analytically the above system of equations for this special case.
In the third equation in (3.2) (i) and (ii), one may be allowed
to interpret this relationship as: dynamic marginal revenue
S£ Sgi(p(t) + X. (t) r
—
)
equals marginal cost (t~) condition; except at the
x ox
.
ox
.
1 1
terminal time T, X . (T) = 0, i = 1,2, must be enforced. A simple conclusion
&g.|
that the terminal marginal costs r
—
j must be equal to the terminal
dX
i ! x.(T)
price can then be derived.
Under a very mild condition along with (2.5), we can claim that
the costate variables \.(t), i - 1,2, remain nonnegative throughout the
time horizon [0,T), (see Appendix 1) . This essentially means that the
optimal price trajectory p*(t) will always be larger than the marginal
ogi
costs t™- (or profits TT. will remain positive along the trajectory).
We now consider the case where the time horizon is infinite.
In this case, our interest is also in studying the behavior of the Cournot
paths as t—®, and in particular whether limiting values exist or not.
As often assumed in infinite horizon problems (see Arrow (1968)), it is
appropriate to assume that the cost functions are time invariant, that is
(3.3) TC. s g.(x . (t)) , for i = 1,2.
The argument behind this assumption according to Arrow is that "the
sequence of conditions to be encountered in the future is much the same
as today, or can be made so after some simple renormaiization." Under

13
these conditions the Cournot closed-loop supply quantities will also be
time invariant of the form x* (p(t)) } i - 1,2, and the necessary conditionsLC
for optimality (see Arrow (1968)) will reduce to:
Firm 1
(3.4) <
(*>1
p(t) = f(p(t),x
1
(p(t))+x
2
(p(t)))
, p(0) = p
c
dx
X
l(
t) - A
l(
t) -x
l(
p(t)) +X
x
(t)(M + M- -jl)
JL i
lim e~ rt X
1
(t) -
t -»«
Firm 2
(ii)i
p(t) = f(p(t) >Xl (p(t))+x2 (p(t))) , p(0) - pq
^(t)«rX
2
(t).x
2
(p(t)) + X
l(
t)(^ +
^§)
dg
2 *f
lim e"
rt
X
2
(t) - .
t -*co
Note the change in the terminal conditions for X (t), and the use of
dg. dx.
total derivatives ~r~ and —— instead of their partial derivatives in (3.2)
dx. dp
i
We now derive very briefly similar conditions for the open-loop
controls for finite and infinite horizon problems.
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B. Open-Loop Controls
Open-loop dynamic Cournot paths (x? (t),x^ (t)) as defined in (2.9)
can be derived as follows. First the Hamiltonian of the ith firm is written as
(3.5) K. = p(t)x
i
(t)-g
t
(t,x
i (t))+Yi (t)f(p(t),x1(t)+x2 (t)), i = 1,2.
and then the necessary conditions for the open- loop Cournot path are given by:
Firm 1
p(t) - f(p(t),x
1
(t) +x
2
(t))
?
x
(t) - rYl (t) -x1 (t)+v1 (t) |p-
p(0) = p^
3 ad
og.
(iX
(3.6)
P (t) - ^ + Yl (t) g- = o
Y
X
(T) =
for a finite horizon problem
o r
dg.
P(t)
^ixt + Y l (t) ^- =0 1
•rt
lim e y (t) =
t -» °°
Firm 2
for an infinite horizon problem
(ii*
l
f(p(t),x
1
(t)+x
2
(t))
, p(0) - p
c
Y2
(t) =rY
2
(t>-x
2
(t) +Y2 Ct) §
and
Y2
(T) -
or
for a finite horizon problem
dg
2 Af N
lim e~
rt
Y2 (
t > "
! t -»cc
- for an infinite horizon problem
J
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A distinctive difference between (3.6) and (3.2) or (3.4) is
of
?x
i
in the second equation: In (3.6), t~ r~~ for i = 1,2, is completely
ox, op
missing. This is exactly the term that expresses the awareness (feedback)
of the firms of the price level in adjusting their supplies. What would
be the effect of this omission cannot be determined in general in analytical
terms, although the numerical examples in Sections 5 and 6 show a clear-cut
difference and tendency. Also as in the closed-loop case, it can be shown
(Appendix 1) that: v. (t) > for all t€[0,T).
Solving the coupled differential equations (3.2), (3.4) or (3.6)
for general nonlinear f(p(t),x(t)) and g, (t,x.(t)) , i = 1,2, is extremely
difficult, and in general, one has to resort to numerical techniques using
a digital computer. However, this does not suggest that we should abandon
analytical attempts for solving and investigating our dynamic Cournot paths.
Thus in the following section we take up a linear dynamic demand
function and quadratic total cost functions case and derive an analytic
solution for tn responding dynamic duopoly game problem. This analytic
solution will enable us to study some properties of the dynamic Cournot'
equilibrium that otherwise could not be studied.
4.
_
Linear -Quadra tic Dynamic Duopoly Games
In this section, we plan to develop analytical solution procedures
to solve fcr the closed- loop and open- loop dynamic Cournot equilibrium price
and supply quantities for both the finite horizon and infinite horizon cases
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The linear dynamic demand function is taken to be of the form
(4.1) p - c ~ ap - ; k.
?
)
e a
^'a "a ^
x
i
+x2^ ~ P^ ^ see (2 ' 3 ^)
4/
where a, b, and c LI positive constants,— and the quadratic cost
functions are assumed to be given as
(4.2) g. = | o^x* i - 1,2
where a; . > for i - : 1.2. The overtime profits can then be written as:
x
v
rn
(4.3) rr, - f e
" rt[px. - \ a,xf]dt , i * 1,2.
Let us first develop the closed- loop solution. After forming the
Hamiltonians
(4.4) Kj - p(t)x
i
(t,p(t))
-| aix^(t,p(t)) + X i (t)(c -ap-b(x 1 (t,p(t))
+ x
2
(t,p(t))))
,
i * 1,2
we derive the following necessary conditions (3.2) and (3.4):
4/
—
' Here we notice that (4.1) satisfies conditions (2.5) only in
c c
the region < p < — and < x n +x„ < r ; Thus in order to account for these&
-_
f
— a - 1 2 - b
constraints, Kuhn -Tucker conditions can be incorporated in the solution;
but since this is not the main issue in this paper, and in order to avoid
unnecessary mathematical complications, it will, be assumed that the solution
obtained will lie in the interior of these constraints, so that the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are no longer needed.
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f
(4.5) <
v.
(i) p(t) - c-ap(t) -b(x
1
(t f p(t))+x2 (t,p(t)» , p(0)-p c
(ii) X (t) * (r +a +b
dx
2
(t,p(t))
axjCt.pct))
^(t) «x
1
<t,p(t»
(iii) X
2
(t) - (r+a+b—~ )X
2
(t) -x
2
(t,p(c))
(iv) p(t) - o?
1
x
1
(t lP (t)) -b\
1
(t) *
(v) p(t) - ©
2
x
2
(t,p(t)) -bX
2
(t) *
end
(vi) X,(T) " ° > ^o(T) for a finite horizon problem
or
(vi)' lira e~
rt
X,(t) =0 , lira e"rt X
2
(t) -
for an infinite horizon problem.
Note that for an infinite horizon problem the supply quantities become time
invariant i.e. x (p(t)) and the partial derivatives in (ii) and (iii)
reduce to total derivatives. From (4.5) (i), (iv) and (v) , we can deduce
that the price movement satisfies
(4.6) P(t) - [c + £• X l(t) + | X2 (t)]-[a + ±- + ^]p(t)
or
p(t) « e(t) -3 P (t)
where & > and constant. The solution of (4.6) is
t
-3t f -3Ct-T^
(t) = e
P
p + e ^
;
e(t)dT.
and therefore it can be easily seen that p*(t) depends not on X. (t) and
X
2
(t) but on their time histories over the interval [0,t). Furthermore
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If X (t) and X..(t) converge within the time horizon to positive constants
X. and X2 , then we can easily see that p*(t) converges to
c + (a~
+
a~
)b
(4.8) pc
= L_l_ >0
.
a +• — + —
"l
a
2
Now we focus our attention on X„(t) and X (t) to find if there is a
i 4.
functional relationship between them and p(t) that will simplify the
solution of (4.5) and possibly reduce it from a set of partial differential
equations to a set of ordinary differential equations. This is achieved
by the form:
(4.9) \
±
(t) - Ki (t)p(t) + Ei (t)
-' i - 1,2
where K. (t) and S (t) are functions of time to be determined. Once this
relationship is established, the closed-loop controls are obtained from
(4.3) (iv) and (v) as:
(4.10) x*
c
(t,p(t)) -^ (l^faK
i
)p(t) - ^-E
i ,
i - 1,2.
In order to determine K. and £ » i * 1,2 5 we differentiate (4.9) to get:
(4.11) X, * K, p + K. p + E.
and from (4.5) (i) and (4.10) we get
—* For simplicity, we will drop the time dependence expression, t
from X., Kj_ and E^
,
i-1,2; hereafter unless stated otherwise.
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2 2
(4.12) p » (c .+^-E 1 +J- E2 ) -<a+£- (l-bK1)+^- (l-bK2 ))p(t)
6/
Now using (4.5) (ii) we get
X.. * K.p+K.P -K.cr p+E,
i i i c i c i
- (r+a+^ (l-bK^XK^+E^-Jj- (1 - bK^p +i Ej
Grouping terms we get
+ [i
l
Pe+ i l
.(r+.+i (i- bK
2
»E
1
-^ E
x
] -
which must hold for all p, implying that
f i-K.Ca +|"(l-bK,) ^(l-blU) +(r+a +^-(1^))^ -^-(1-bKj)
(4.13) l 2
2
2
X
1*1" ^
1 -bK2>> El^ ErKl<C^ E l +£ E2>'2 1 1 Z
Similarly from (4.5) (iii) we get
(4.13) (ii)
\ -K^(a +~r(l-bK1 ) +^-(l~bK2 )) + (r+a 4™(l-bK1))K2 -—(l-bl^)
.2 2
[i2 -(rt«+^(l.bK1 ))E2 +- E£ -K2 (c+- E 1+~ E2 ).
£/ It will be shown later that for an infinite horizon problem,
a (t) and Pc (t) become c its ctc and p and the price p*(t) will
asymptotically converge to p„ - P" jo .
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We also note that X, (T) = X.(T) * imply that K^T) = IC, (T) » E (T) =
E 9 (T) - 0. These will serve as boundary conditions for the above
differential equations. Thus K. and E. in (4.10) are obtained by solving
backward in time the system of coupled ordinary differential equations
(4.13). It is interesting to note that the equations for K
1
and K~ are not
coupled with those of E.. and E , and therefore one can solve for K and IC
first, and then for E.. and E 9 . Furthermore the equations for K.. and K~ are
of the Riccati type (quadratic) and numerical programs for their solution
on a digital computer are readily available. The equations for E.. and E~
are linear, and are easy to solve.
When the time horizon is infinite, it can be shown that K. (t)
and E. (t) will become constants (K. = E. =0) and the dynamic Cournot
supply quantities are given by
(4.14)
b r
i i
•
1-1,2
where K,» K.^ > £ i an(* E? are solutions of the following algebraic equations
* *
obtained from (4.13) by setting K. = E- - 0.
(4.15) <
(a) K
1
Cr+2a+^- (1-bK^ +2 £- (l-bl^)]
-^ (1-bK^
1 !
K2 rr+2a+A d-wp+2 i Ci-bK,)]-^ (i-bij)
h h K2
(b) [r +a +f- (l-bKx ) +£• (l-bK2 )]E 1 - Kj ~ E2 - K^
(b') [r+a+^- (1-^)+— (l-bK2)]E
2
- IC, £- E
x
- l^c
=
=
=
=
and (4.12) becomes
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2 2
(4.16) p - (c +£- Ej +~ E2 ) - (a +£- (1-b^) +~ (l-bE,))?
= P
c
-a
c
p .
There are two questions, however, that still need to be answered:
i) Does the system of equations (4.15) have a solution?
ii) Are the boundary conditions (4.5) (vi) ' on \. (t) satisfied?
In order to answer these questions, we need the following proposition:
Proposition 1 : Equations (4.15) have a solution K,, IC, E., and E2 , that
satisfies
<*!<£ > 0<K2<i
Proof : The proof is given in Appendix 2
.
Thus, the above proposition guarantees the existence of a solution to (4.15)
which has the property that o in (4.16) is positive. Therefore as t-»°°,
the price p*(t) (which is the solution of (4.16)) will approach
asymptotically a constant value
c a
c
and the boundary conditions (4.5) (vi 1 ) are automatically satisfied
(4.17) lim e"
rt
X (t) * lim e"
rt (£ p*(t) +1. ) 0.
One of the common features of the above finite and infinite horizon
solutions is that in both cases the supply quantities are linear functions
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of the price, however, in the finite horizon case these linear functions
are time varying (4.10) while in the Infinite horizon case (4.14) they are
not.
We stated at the beginning of this paper that the closed-loop
and open-loop supply curves are generally quite different. In the
following we plan to develop the open-loop solution for the finite and
infinite horizon cases of the linear quadratic dynamic duopoly game given
by (4.1)-(4.3). The Hamiltonians of the system are:
H
1 2
(4.18)
x
P(t)x
x
(t)
-j a
]
x
1
(t)+v
1
(t)(c -ap(t) -b(Xl (t)+x2 (t)))
H
2
-= p(t)x
2
(t)-ior
2
^(t)+Y
2
(t)(c-ap(t)-b(x
1
(t)+x
2
(t))).
Note that the supply quantities x and x„ are no longer functions of
p(t). Following (3.6), the necessary conditions for the open-loop
solutions are:
(i) p(t) - c-ap(t) -b(x
I
(t)+x
2
(t))
(ii) v
3
(t) - (r+a)Y
1
(t)
-x
x
(t)
(4
» P(0) - p,
.19)1
(iii) Y2 (t)
= (r+a)Y
2
(t)
-x
2
(t)
(iv) p(t) -^(t)
-bY
1
(t) -
(v) p(t) -»
2
x
2
(t)
-bY
2
(t) =
(vi) Y (T) - and Y2 <T) for a finite horizon problem
(vi)' lim e"
rt
Y 1 (^) = and lira e"
r%2 (t) -
t -• CO t -» 00
for an infinite horizon problem,
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As in the closed-loop case, it is easy to see that the open-
loop price movement will follow the differential equation
.2 ,2
P - (c+7Y,(t)+7Y2 (t))-(a+-+7) p(t),
°I
L
2 1 2
and that if YiC1 ) and Y? (t) converge within the time horizon to Y-i and Y2 >
positive constants; then the open-loop price will converge to
C + (-i + ~)b
"l
Q
2(4.20) p ± ^- > .
a + Jl + A
a
l
Q
2
Whether we have an infinite or a finite horizon problem, Eq. (4.19) can
be solved directly, as a two point boundary value problem, for x* (t)
and Xj (t) . Naturally these supply functions will depend implicitly on
p ; and for each value of p , (4.19) has to be solved repeatedly for the
corresponding open-loop supply functions. This numerically cumbersome
procedure, however, can be avoided by noting, as in the closed-loop case,
that Y. (t) can be expressed in terms of p(t) by an expression of the form
(4.21) Yi (t) - Di (t)p(t) + P. (t) , i
* 1,2.
The price at time t then will satisfy the differential equation
2 2
(4.22) p « (c +£-F
1
+£-F2)-(a+^- (1-bDj +^~ <l-bD2» p(t)12 1 2
" Po
(t)
-V t)p(t)
and its solutions gives the open- loop Cournot price:
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(4.23)
-J VT)dT
Po (t)
= e ° P + J" e
o
t -J
4
v^
P Q
(T)dT.
The open- loop supply functions can then be computed from (4.19) (iv) and
(v) as
(4.24) x* (t) = ^- (p*(t) -bYi (t))
i
~ (l-bD.)(e '
i
-/ a
o
(T)dT
t -J
a
Q
(X)dX
Po+Je P (T ) dT)-^ Fi
o 1
i 1,2.
Now in order to determine D. (t) and F. (t), we follow a procedure similar
to that used for determining K. (t) and E. (t) of the closed-loop solution,
Then it can be easily shown that D. (t) and F, (t), i * 1,2 must satisfy
the differential equations
.25H(4 25)
(a) D
x
= D
1
(r+2a+^- (1-bD^ +~ (l-bD
2
>)-~- (1-bD^
(a)' D
2
- D
2
(r+2a+^- (i-^) +£- (1 .bD2>) .-i. (i-bD
2
)
(b) F
X
- (r + .+i-(l.bD
1
»F
1
-^D
1
F
2
-D
1
c
(b) , f
2
. (r + a +
^
(l-bD
2
))F
2
-^D
2
F
1
-D
2
c
with the boundary conditions D (T) = D (T) = F
1
(T) = F9 (T) =0. The
equations for D, and D2 are again recognized to be of the Riccati type
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When the time horizon is infinite, it can be easily shown that
(4.19) will be satisfied if the supp
_y functions are of the form
(4.26) x* (t)10
-o- t t -a (t-T)_
— (l-bD.)Ce ° p +J e ° p dT}-~F.
cr. 1/ *o J o or. i
i o i
1 -a t p p .
I „ ,r ,r o . o..O") b —
o o r
a. i
1
where (4.22)
i -
p -a t P ,
__
-7- (l-bD.)(p
-rr)e ° + ~ (1-bD.) — -~- F.
a. i /Vi o q or. i' of or. t
and
b
2
- b
2
-
P
o "
c + 3" F
l
+ S" F2
ff
o
.. + A (l.M
1
)+i(i.w
2 ),
and where D. , D« , F. and F« are a solution of the following algebraic set
• *
of equations obtained from (4.25) by setting D. = F. - 0:
D
x
(r+2a + ~ (1-bD^ + ~ (l-bD
2»
-
~- (1-bD^ -12 1
(4.27) <
D
2
(r+2a + ~ (1-bD^ + ~- (l-bD
2»
-
~ (l-bD
2
) =
b
2
(r+a + ^(l.bD
1
))F
1
-
- D^ - D^ =
b b
2
[ (r+a +- (l-bD2 ))F2 - ^ D^ - D2 c - 0.
As in the closed-loop case, there are also two questions that need to be
answered for this infinite horizon solution:
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i) does the system of equations (4.27) have a solution?
ii) are the boundary conditions (4.19) (vi)' satisfied?
In order to answer these questions, we need the following proposition.
Proposition 2 : Equations (4.27) have a solution D. , D„, F. and F„ that
satisfies
< iL < ~ , Q < D < r .
— 1 ~ b — 2. — b
Proof ; The proof is given in Appendix -2
.
Thus the above proposition guarantees the existence of a
solution to (4.27) which has the property that a is positive and
constant. Hence as t-*"5 , the price p*(t) (4.22 - 4.23) will approach
">vmptoticaliy p - p /o and the boundary conditions (4.19) (vi)' will
be automatically satisfied
lim e"
rt
y. (t) - lim e"
rt
(B. p*(t) +F. ) - 0.
t-»» x t-»°°
10 x
Comparing the above closed-loop and open-loop solutions it is now clear
that p"(t) is different from p (t) . The effect of the missing term
ox.
b -r— , i 1,2, in (4.19) (ii) and (iii) is still difficult to trace out
analytically. However, unless b = 0, which is a trivial and almost
meaningless case in our dynamic duopoly game, this effect must appear
somehow as will be clearly seen in the numerical examples in Section 5 to
follow*
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3. A Numerical Example
In this section we show he » the infinite timp horizon closed-
loop and open-loop solutions are obtained for our dynamic Cournot duopoly
game with the following dynamic demand function:
(5.1) p « 4 -2p- (x
1
+x
? )
and the following ccst functions
(5.2) g * j x and g2 ^ x2
For a 107o discount rate, the infinite horizon profits are
(5.3)
0.1t r 1 2-,..
PX2 - j x2^
Comparing these expressions with (4.1)-(4.3) we see that the parameter
values are; a * 2, b - 1, c = 4, «., * 2/3, QL 1 and r = 0.1. Thus the
equations for K., and %L in (4. 15) (a) ,(a) ' in the closed-loop solution
become
(a) 1 5Kj + 2K.K2 -9.11^ + 1.5 -
(a)' 4 + SK-jKj -9.1K2 + 1 «
which are solved simultaneously for
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(5.5) Kj * 0.17 and ^ 0.12.
This pair clearly satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1. When these
values are substituted in (4.15) (b)-(b)' the following equations are
obtained
" (b) 4.22E
1
- 0.17E
?
= 0.68
(b)' -0.18E
1
+ 4.22E
2
- 0.48
and their solutions are
(5.7) E, = 0.165 and ?
2
- 0.126.
Now by (4.14), we get the closed-loop Cournot supply functions for firms 1
and 2 as follows:
LC
(5.3)
xt (p(t)) « -0.248 + 1.25 p(t)
1
c
I x|c (p(t)) - -0.126 + 0.88 p(t)
The price change, p, can now be written by using (5.8) and (4.12) as a
function of p only:
(5.9) p(t) « 4.374 - 4.13 p(t).
This gives us the equilibrium price p when t-,c0 :
(5.10) V" fct? " 1M >
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and the time path of the price when the initial price is given as p is
(5.11) p*(t) - (p -1.06)e"4
' 13t
+ 1.06.
Figure 2 shows the dime paths of p*(t) when p ~ p ~ 2 and
2
p = p - 1/2. Also we can draw a static duopoly game analogue of quantity
o * o
price relationships by using ( ind (5.8) as shown in Figure 3. Thus as
1
is clear from the above development, when the initial price, say, p =2,
the optimal supply rate is shown as x*(p )• The price change is obviously
o o
negative aud as a result the price will decrease. However as this is
happening, the total supply will also be adjusted by (5.8) and hence both
price and total supply will move in the negative direction along x£(p )>C
until the closed-loop equilibrium point C is reached. Similarly, if the
2
initial price is p = 0.5 then the price change will be upward along
x*'(P')»C until point C is reached.
c *o
Let us now solve the numerical example given above for the
open-loop Couraot controls. Substituting the numerical values of the
given parameters in (4.25) and solving the resulting equations we get
D
x
* , 0.14
F
x
« 0.251
, F
2
- 0.20?.
The dynamic demand function (4.22) reduces to
(5.12) p(t) ^ 4.584 -4.07 p(t)
and the equilibrium open-loop price as t ~- ro is
4.584 . .«
ro 4.07
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The time path of the open- loop price when the initial price is p
(5.13) p*(t) - (p - 1.13)e"
4 "07t
+ 1.13,
and the open- loop Cournofc supply quantities are (4.24):
x* (t) « 1.21(p -1.13)e"4,07t +0.98
lo o
x* (t) « 0.86(p - 1.13)e"4 ' 07t +0.76 .
Welfare implications of these two results may be of some significance it
any generalization such as to follow is allowed. The closed-loop con-rc .
law keeps both firms in the market aware of the reaction of the price cue
to their output decisions and allows them to adjust their outputs based
on the current price in the market. The open-loop controls, on the o
hand, provide for an initial programming of the outputs of both £3
the time horizon and does net allow for any deviations £rc:i: these values.
Certainly if the price can be measured at each instant t
loop controls are more desirable than the open-loof controls. Furthernore
from the above numerical example, one may de that, gi
a sufficiently long adjustment period, (i) the closed-loop equili
price is lower than its counterpart, the open-loop equilibr Lee, and
(2) the closed-loop equilibrium quantity supplied ) larger than i ;
open- loop counterpart. Thus, the consumer's welfare may, in general,
higher in the closed- loop equilibrium than in the open-loop equilibr:'-

w X
6
«. ..
Optimal Supply Control of Collusive Duopollst3
When the two firms take a collusive action in adjusting their
supply in the way to maximize their joint profit, our differential game
collapses to the following optimal control problem:
Find the optimal supply functions (x^(t),x«(t)) that maximize
(6.1) TT «= TT. + TL
C 1 2
! e"
r [p(t)(Xl (t)+x2 (t)) -g^t.x^t)) -g2 (t,x2 (t))]dt
subject to
(6.2) p(t) - f(p(t) l x
1
(t)+x
2
(t» p(0) - p^
By forming the Hamiltonian
(6.3) H
c
- p(t)(x
3
(t)+x
2
(t)) -g
1
(t,x
1
(t)) -g
2
(t,x
2
(t))
+§(t)f(p(t),x
1
(t)+x
2
(t))
we can easily derive the following necessary conditions for optimality —
'
(i) p« f(p,x
1
+x
2 )
of,
(6.4)
p(0) = p.
(ii) g - (r + ^)C - (x
i
+x
2 )
eg.
-
(iii) p - ^ + | ^f -oxj dx
1
og
?
..
(tv) P -r + 5r e °ax
2
dx
2
6/
—
' Obviously, since this is an optimal control problem, the open-loof
and closed-loop solutions lead to the same optimal paths. For obvious
reasons however, we will derive the control in closed-loop form.
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t
(6.4)
i
(v) §{T) * for a finite horizon problem
or
"*rfc
(v) f lira e §(t) = for an infinite horizon problem.
£ -* 00
if ^r
Since ^— =* -— , the third and fourth relations yield an interesting
ox, dx^
result in that
(6.5)
*
dg
l
Sg
2
"dx* dx,,
'
thac is> in order to maximize their joint profit, the two firms must adjust
their supplies in such a way that along the optimal path, their marginals
costs are equal. Furthermore it can be easily proved that ?(t) > for
all t£[0.T) (see Appendix 1) which means that the price will always be
larger than the marginal cost of either firm, and that p(T) - —
—
c-g
2
1
dX
l
ex
t =T
2 ( t«T
Applying these conditions to the linear-quadratic case (4.1) -(4.2),
it follows from (6.5) that
(6.6) a x*(t) *-a
2 xJ(t)
which means that the optimum output of the first firm is exactly (Q/-/Q! ) of
that of the second firm, Thus, the more efficient firm gets the larger
(fixed) market share. The necessary conditions (6,4) reduce to:
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a.
(6.7) <
(t) p * c-ap~b(l +~)x- * p(0) - p
o
(ii) I - (r+a)|- (l +rr)x.
(iii) p -o^ -bC *
and
(iv) §(T) -
or
-rt.
(iv) e lim a §(t) -
t-»»
for a finite horizon problem
for an infinite horizon problem.
These conditions can also be expressed in terms of x« by making use of
(6.6).
Following a procedure similar to (4. 9) -(4. 13) , it can be shown
that for a finite horizon problem^ % and p are related by the linear time
varying expression
5(t) = M(t)p(t) + N(t)
where M(t) , and N(t) are the scluti.cn of
(6.8)
M «M(r+2a+b(~ + ^-)(l-bM)) - (~ +~)(l-bM)
N (r+a+b(-~- +~)(l-bM))N -Mc
with M(T) and N(T) » 0.
The collusive supply curves in closed-loop form are:
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(6.9) x*(t,p(t)) * ± (l-bM)p(t) - ~ N , i - 1,2.
1
i i
If the time horizon is infinite, then the relationship between
§ and p become time invariant:
(6.10) §(t) * M P(t) + N
where M and N are constants satisfying the algebraic equations
M(r+2a+b(-L +~-)(i-bJl)) - (~- + ~-)(l-bM) -
1 2 1 2
(6.11)
(r+a+b(^- + ;~-)(l-bM))N -Mc « 0.
The collusive supply curves in this case are
(6.12) x*(p(t» - ~- (l-bM)p(t) - ~~ N , i - 1,2
x
i °i
and in order to shov that the boundary conditions (6.4) (v) ' are satisfied,
we note that by simple algebraic manipulations it can. be shown that (6.11)
has a solution M, N satisfying
(6.13) < M < £ ,N>0
and hence, the collusive price trajectory which satisfies,
(6.14) p - (c+b2 (^- + -i-)K) -(a+b(~- +"L)(l-bM))p(t)
1 2 1
a
2
approaches asymptotically the equilibrium price
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2 1 1 —
-12
(6.15) p - —T Sp £— > .
fi+b<-±- +~-.)(i-bM)
Thus
lim e"
rt§.(t) - lira e" rt[M.p*(t) +N. ] - .
£ -* as t: ~* °°
The existence of the equilibrium collusive price is then always guaranteed.
Let us now obtain the infinite time horizon collusive solution
for the numerical example which was considered in. Section 5. With the
given parameters the solution of (6,11) is
M 0.30 and N - 0.312.
The collusive supply curves (6.12) are:
f x*(p(t)> - -0.467 + 1.05 p(t)
(6.16)
^ xJCp(t)) - "0-312 +0.70 p(t)
and the price trajectory is
(6.17) p*(t) - (p - 1.27)e"
3,75t
+ 1.27
which has an equilibrium level p K 1.27.
For the purpose of comparison the equilibrium levels of the results
obtained from the Cournot and the collusion solutions for the numerical example
are summarized in Table 1. The first three columns in this table refer to the
equilibrium levels of the price and the outputs of both firms. The last
three columns refer to the equilibrium values of the undiscounted profits
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.
u u a 4J
i
H a B O ft c 3 «rl
3
,
.-t 3
.
<M 3 <+-) 3 <•« ^4 *M
•H •rl >« •r-i •H u o
i-* <l> k H S* 4J «-< S-s -U <N ja ^
.Q t» »D U J3 4J .fi "^ J3 -«•* •M 0-1
•^
-r< •H 3 •r4 J-t S ft
l-< *4 «-« Q. H vl 6 •H <u
- * •r! 4J •^ U ft 4-» <H •*4 <J-i «r< d c
1 3 3
cro
3 o t* 3 O fc. cr ».-<
0* D< K Cf S-i w o
w W w h3 P4 w fu >->
i
*3
C C* .
u 5 3
1.06 1.07 0.81 0.75 0.53 1.28
o o
e
o
Dynamic
o •
D •
w o 1.13 0.98 0.73 0.79 0.57 1.366 QO ^
Static 1.14 0.97 0.76 0.78 0.58 1.36
c
H
O 12.
*4 o o
n f-4
=* I l~<
r-4 Dynamic -0 J 1.27 0.86 0.58 0.84 0.57 1.41
O &i 0)
o &
; o
o
.-,. ...
Static L.29 0.86 0.57 0.86 0.57 1.43
Table 1

37
JX
per unit time (i.e. p x. - r Qf,x"). These would represent a measure of
the future profits after th e ini tial transient price adjustment period
has died tway, Two additional reference strategies, static Cournot and
static collusion strategies, have also been added to the table. These
were computed on the basis that price reacts instantaneously to changes in
c b
outputs (i.e. p ~ and p ~ ~ - — (x- +x? ).
The following specific conclusions are imminent:
(i) The closed-loop Cournot equilibrium is most desirable from the
consumer welfare point of view. The open- loop Cournot equilibrium
Is less desirable than the closed- loop counterpart, and the
collusive monopolist equilibrium is the least desirable. As
far as "desirability" is concerned, the firms may see it in the
reverse order.
(ii) The static Cournot solution is very close to or almost
identical to the open-loop Cournot at equilibrium, and the static
collusive monopolist exhibits almost the same type of price and
output strategy as its dynamic counterpart. This implies that whether
the adjustment is instantaneous or dynamic, as long ea they ignore
additional information in their decision-making, they end up, after the
initial transient period, wi th • (almost) the same equilibrium strategv.
In this paper , we have not analyzed the effect of change of the
discount rate on the dynamic Cournot paths and the Cournot equilibrium.
However, we are studying this aspect and a new result is expected shortly.
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Conclusion
It seems that the biggest hard'ie in the way of formulating the
dynamic duopoly game vac the intrinsic difficulty in establishing the
dynamic relationship between the market supply and demand functions. In
this paper the concept of a dynamic demand function was introduced as a
means of reflecting the time delays (or dynamics) associated with the
reaction in the price whenever the market supply is changed. This dynamic
relationship Is certainly more natural than the well established static one
where price reacts instantaneously to a change in supply- The profit
functions over a certain time horizon are then readily defined and the
resulting dynamic duopoly game extends naturally as a problem within the
framework of differential game theory. The necessary conditions for the
solution of this problem are then developed for general dynamic demand
functions and cost functions. These conditions yield some general results,
but. not specific enough to give us quantitative information. The linear-
demarsd quadratic-cost functions case ras then studied in detail and a
numerical example is solved for the closed-loop and open- loop Cournot
paths and equilibria. In order to make our analysis complete the dynamic
collusive solution is then studied, and formulated as an optimal control
problem. The collusive solution is then obtained for the same numerical
example and some welfare implications of the equilibrium solutions are then
discussed.
There are several other aspects of our dynamic duopoly game that
are still subject to further investigation. These are
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i) To evaluate (analytically if possible) the effect of the
discount rate on the Courn^t and collusion p.ths and equilibria.
ii) To build a model that can take care of inventory accumulation
and decumulation.
iii) To explore the possibility of formulating combined closed-loop,
open-loop strategies in order to handle cases where price
measurements are obtained at discrete instants of time (for
example at the end of each month) rather than continuously
(see Siraaan and Cruz (1973c))
»
iv) To study and develop other strategies such as the Stackelberg
strategy etc.... in a dynamic framework.
Finally } as a natural extension of these efforts, our model may serve as a
starting point for stochastic analysis of dynamic duopoly games. When the
system dynamics contain structural stochastic components or when the para-
meters of the system are subject to some stochastic law, we may be able to
solve, for instance by following Aoki (1973), for stochastic Cournot or
collusion controls. This way. the effect of uncertainties on the
duopolists strategies j the equilibrium prices and the consumer welfare can
be studied and some light can be shed on this vast and mostly unexplored
field.

40
Appendix 1
From (3.2) the equation f r X. can be < i as
(Al) ^(t) - (r -
-g - & -J-)X
i
(t) - Xl (t,p(t)) , Xt (T)
-0
ox
where i K l, j ~ 2 or 1*2, j--l. Under the assumption that
(2.5) it follows that
(A2) (r - ~ - •$£-
~r*-> > 0.dp dx dp -
Me will show that X (t) > by contradiction. Assume that for some t,
1 ~"
X, (t) < 0, then since X. (T) - 0, there must exist a t, such that X. (t,) <
and X. (£ ) > 0. But this is a contradiction since such a X, (t) will never11 i
satisfy A., identical proofs hold for Y (t) and C, (t).
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Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 1: Let X be a compact subset of the real line R
defined by
X * CK t R : < K < 1]
Now rearrange Eq. (4.15 (a) and (a)') in the following form
(Bl) 4
f
(a) 4~WKi + "2"" °
b
(a)' 1^ "*2 (K1 )K2
+
~2 = °
b
where
(32)
[
(a) ^Oy - ~| [r +2a + £ + g r^)]
^
s
1 2
(a)' v (K,) -4 [r+2a +^+^-(l-bK.)]
I
-
* l b
a
2
a
i .
L
Now for each IIUGX* a solution to (Bl (a)) is
(B3)
1
- <*i
k
i
=?w - yt y i ck2> -tI-
and the following inequalities can be shown by simple algebraic manipulations
on (B2(a}>:
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f
(i) ^(Kj) >
(B4) (ii) \ ^(Kj) - "7>0
b
b
Thus from (B4(iii)) it follows that K, in (B3) satisfies
S «! < £
or K, €^f« Therefore (B3) defines a continuous mapping from X "* X>
Similarly for each K*
€X* a solution to (Bl(a)') is
(B5) h * 2W " v 4 ^2^2 } \2
and by the same argument^ (B5) defines a continuous mapping from X ~* X*
Thus by the Brower fixed point theorem, there exists a pair (K-plO,
LSft'and K^ZX which satisfies (B3> and (B5) or (Bl(a)) and (Bl(a)')
simultaneous
Since p > 0, (see footnote 4), it follows from (4.16) that
p' > and this a] : ,15b - ! -plies that E > and E
2
>
The proof of Proposition 2 Imost identical to the above and
therefore it will be omitted.
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